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FOREWORD
Today, there is a growing recognition that at particular stages of financial sector
development he conversion of the traditional manually-processed payment system into an
electronic fund transfer system supports ound financial market development through improved
certainty and timeliness of payments. When a party transforms, through electronic means, its
claim against a bank into another party's claim against a bank, the product of wire transfer
processing is a distinctly legal concept. Thus, one of the common tasks of the World Bank in
helping develop wire transfer systems in client countries is to provide technical advice on setting
up the legal framework governing payment transactions.
The paper by Professor Raj Bhala is prepared to serve this purpose. It was
originally presented at the World Bank Seminar on "Payment Systems in Financial Sector
Development" in April 1995. This seminar was initiated by the Financial Sector Development
Department of the World Bank and organized in conjunction with the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond. Given the positive response to this paper, and the ensuing debate it provoked, we
decided to publish this paper to a wider audience.
We are sure this paper will prove to be of great interest o those who specialize
in payment systems issues, as well as those with a broader interest in financial matters during
transition and development.
Gary L. Perlin
Director
Financial Sector Development Department
Financial and Private Sector Development
The World Bank
I
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the legal foundations of large-value credit transfer systems
and the importance of certainty, efficiency, and fairness in funds transfer law. A case study is
presented to highlight key terminology and concepts. Thereafter, five particularly noteworthy
legal rules are discussed in the context of the case study: (1) a rule defining the scope of the
law; (2) a rule establishing when the rights and obligations of parties to a funds transfer are
triggered; (3) a receiver finality rule; (4) a rule assigning liability for interloper fraud; and (5) a
money-back guarantee rule, coupled with provisions on discharge. Finally, strategic concerns
affecting the drafting of a funds transfer law are identified.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper explains the interactions among the main pillars of law which
should govern large-value credit transfer systems. It does so by focusing on the essence of
the American legal regime governing large-value credit transfer systems. The same essential
principles discussed herein are found in the new international legal regime governing these
systems. Accordingly, the paper will be useful to readers who are concerned with the
development of funds transfer laws in other countries.
The paper consists of four remaining parts. In Part 1, the relationship between
the legal framework for a large-value credit transfer system and the development of an ideal
system is discussed. Part 11 briefly surveys the five foundations of a legal framework for
large-value credit transfer systems. Part Ill introduces a case study of a funds transfer and
employs essential egal terminology. In Part IV, the five foundations of a legal regime
governing funds transfer law are discussed in detail using the essential legal terminology.
Part V considers general principles of drafting a funds transfer law in the special context of
developing and transition economies. The countries of the former Soviet Union and Baltic
region are considered as examples. Finally, concluding observations are set forth in Part VI.
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1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GOVERNING LEGAL REGIME
A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a thorough discussion of large-
value credit transfers is a treatment of U.C.C. Article 4A. Whether these transfers are popular
means of payment from the view of individual transactors, and whether they are conducted
in a safe and sound manner from the view of bank supervisors, are issues that necessarily
involve the law. Funds transfer law should serve the interests of the commercial parties who
look to large-value credit transfer systems to settle their payment obligations and in particular
should facilitate growth in domestic and international transactions. As discussed below, ill-
conceived funds transfer ules, or a legal void, can retard the growth and development of
large-value credit transfer systems. In turn, the underlying transactions which generate
payments obligations may be hampered.
Large-value credit transfers are of enormous importance. For example, over
80 percent of the dollars transferred in the United States are sent over large-dollar electronic
funds transfer networks. Every day in the United States, roughly two trillion U.S. dollars are
transferred by means of Fedwire and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS).
Depending on the structure of the laws governing funds transfers, potential users and
providers of funds transfer services may find these services either more or less attractive.
With so much money transferred "by wire" each day, and with the average
value of each transfer so high, the potential for large losses is great. Thus, commercial parties
making and receiving such payments require a clear, comprehensible, and sensible legal
regime to answer two basic questions. First, how should a funds transfer normally work?
Second, what happens if a mishap occurs? There is a third public policy issue of particular
concern to central bankers, namely, systemic risk - how can this risk be minimized and
contained?
One way to approach these issues is to consider the theoretical underpinnings
of an ideal payments ystem. Arguably, an ideal payments ystem must have three salient
features: it must be certain (i.e., reliable), efficient (i.e., high speed, low cost, and high
security), and fair (i.e., equitable in its apportionment of liability).1' That is, large amounts
of funds must be transmitted at low cost and with high security, and the rights and obligations
of parties to the funds transfer must be allocated in a fair manner. A legal framework for a
large-value credit transfer system is essential to ensuring that all three features are present in
the system.
±' See generally Raj Bhala, Paying for the Deal: An Analysis of Wire Transfer Law and International Financial
Market Interest Groups, 42 KANSAS LAW REVIEw 667 (spring 1994) and ERNEST . PATRIKIS, THOMAS C. BAXTER, JR.,
AND RAJ BHALA, WIRE TRANSFERS 23-5 (1993).
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First, burdensome or unclear legal rules raise the costs of a funds transfer,
thereby reducing efficiency. In turn, the system becomes less attractive to potential providers
of system services, users of those services, or both. For example, suppose an automobile
company instructs its bank to make a $5 million payment to a steel supplier. The payment
is made through the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), but before the
payment transaction is complete BCCI fails. Does the automobile company, the steel
company, the creditors of BCCI, or some other party bear the $5 million loss? If the legal
framework fails to provide an unequivocal answer, then uncertainty is generated. In reaction
to uncertainty, system providers and users must take precautions - that is, insure against risks
- hence, the cost of providing and using the system inevitably will increase.
Second, the lack of rules on authenticity and security reduces reliability.
Consequently, the system creates uncertainties and risk for both its providers and users. For
example, suppose a U.S. bank that receives a $500,000 payment instruction from one of its
customers discovers - after the payment is made to an offshore bank - that the instruction
is unauthorized. What are the rights and obligations of the U.S. bank, its customer, and the
offshore bank? If the legal framework does not provide a clear answer, then the system will
be viewed as unreliable by prospective users and providers of system services.
Third, an over-allocation of duties to system providers or to system users can
be unfair. In addition, it may lead to a non-level playing field. For example, where liabilities
are skewed toward non-bank users of a large-value funds transfer system, banks may enjoy
a monopoly position. When potential users or providers perceive a system to be unfair, they
simply will not use or provide, respectively, system services.
In sum, there is an integral link between (1) the legal foundations of a large-
value credit transfer system and (2) extent to which that system is an ideal one. The essence
of the American and United Nations legal regimes governing large-value credit transfer
systems can be grasped by understanding five legal rules. These rules - the five legal
foundations - are designed to make the systems to which the rules apply more efficient,
reliable, and safe. To be sure, these are not the only rules in the U.S. or international funds
transfer laws, and reasonable people may contend that there are other equally or even more
essential statutory provisions. But, distilling the law to five rules assuredly yields much of the
essence of the law.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIVE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
To appreciate the rules, it is first necessary to master the terminology of funds
transfer law and to use applicable terms in the context of a typical funds transfer. (The terms
"funds transfers" and "credit transfers" are used interchangeably, as are the terms "funds
transfer systems" and "large-value credit transfer systems."21) Accordingly, the five critical
elements in the American and international funds transfer laws are set forth in the appropriate
legal terminology and context.
The economic and policy justifications for the five legal rules are beyond the
scope of this presentation.)' Similarly, there is no attempt o argue or prove that the rules
discussed herein are the exclusive legal pillars of funds transfer law. By setting forth the
important provisions in American funds transfer law, the presentation will serve as a point of
departure for the future work and study of the lawyer, banker, or scholar.4'
The five rules are set forth in Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), the principal law in the United States governing funds transfers,5 and the United
-' A definition of "funds transfers" is found in U.C.C. Section 4A-104(a), and a "funds transfer system" is defined in
Section 4A-105(a)(5).
3. For theoretical discussions of funds transfer law, see Raj Bhala, Paying for the Deal: An Analysis of Wire Transfer
Law and International Financial Market Interest Groups," 42 KANSAS LAw REVIEW 667 (spring 1994) and The
Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL 347 (winter 1993-94) reprinted in JOSEPH J.
NORTON, ET AL., EDS., ELECTRONIC BANKING (1994). See also Fairfax Leary, Jr. and Patricia B. Fry, A 'Systems
Approach' to Payment Modes: Moving Toward a New Payments Code, 16 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW
JOURNAL 283 (1984); and Hal S. Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1664 (1983). For a microeconomic analysis of loss allocation rules in consumer payments
transactions, see R. Cooter and E. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 TEXAS LAW
REVIEW 63 (1987) and Hal S. Scott, THE RISK FIXERS, 91 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 737 (1978). For this analysis in the
funds transfer context, see Judge Richard Posner's opinion in Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
4/ This is not to imply that Article 4A is the sole practical alternative or teaching model. Indeed, the recently-
approved United Nations Model Law on Intemational Credit Transfers is available for national egislatures to enact
in whole or part. U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at Annex 1 p. 48, U.N. Doc. A/47/17 (1992). For a
discussion ofthe Model Law, see ERNEST T.PATRIKIS, THOMAS C. BAXTER, JR., AND RAJ BHALA WIRE TRANSFERS parts
IlIl and V (1993).
' Article 4A does not govern paper-based methods of payments like negotiable instruments or letters of credit
(though, of course, payment orders associated with an electronic funds transfer may be issued in writing). The
version of Article 4A cited here is the 1989 Official Text with Comments approved by the American Law Institute
and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). States have been quick to
incorporate Article 4A into their Uniform Commercial Codes, with over forty states enacting the statute in less
than three years. Information on state enactment is provided by NCCUSL. As discussed below, Regulation J,
(continued...)
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Nations Model Law on International Credit Transfers (U.N. Model Law), the main
international legal agreement on funds transfer rules.6y They are:
(1) a scope rule to differentiate the parties and payment instructions that are
included in the law from those that are not included;
(2) a trigger event to indicate the moment when the rights and obligations of a
party to a funds transfer are manifest;
(3) a receiver finality rule to establish when credit to an account is irrevocable;
(4) a money-back guarantee to cover situations where a funds transfer is not
completed, coupled with a discharge rule for cases where the transfer is
completed; and,
(5) an anti-fraud rule to allocate liability for fraudulent payments instructions.
N (... continued)
which govems Fedwire, essentially incorporates this version of Article 4A by reference, with some modifications
and additions.
Regulation J is codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 210 subpart B (1992). Similarly, the New York Clearing House has
selected New York's version of Article 4A as the law applicable to CHIPS. In addition, relevant additional
provisions are set forth in Federal Reserve Bank operating circulars and the CHIPS rules. For a discussion of
Regulation J and Operating Circular No. 8, and of the CHIPS rules, see ERNEST . PATRIKIS, THOMAS C. BAXTER,
JR., AND RAJ BHALA, WIRE TRANSFERS part III (1993).
k' Like Article 4A, the Model Law govems electronic transfers and not paper-based methods of payment like
negotiable instruments or letters of credit. Hereinafter, references are to U.C.C. Article 4A and certain analogous
provisions in the Model Law.
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111. A CASE STUDY
A discussion of the five key rules of U.C.C. Article 4A is aided by reference
to a case study of a funds transfer. Consider the following hypothetical :Z
(1) An automobile manufacturer buys steel worth $100,000 from a steel company
to make vehicles. The steel company delivers the steel to the automobile
manufacturer, and the manufacturer now seeks to pay the company for the
steel by funds transfer.
(2) The manufacturer and steel company hold their accounts at different banks.
(3) The manufacturer instructs its bank to pay $100,000 to the steel company.
The instruction contains the name and account number of the steel company
and the name and identifying number of the steel company's bank.
(4) The automobile manufacturer's bank complies with the instruction of its
customer by further instructing a second bank to pay $100,000 to the steel
company. This second instruction again contains the relevant information
about the steel company and its bank.
(5) The second bank also complies with the instruction it received. It further
instructs the bank at which the steel company has an account to pay $100,000
to the steel company.
(6) The steel company's bank complies with the third instruction and pays the
company.
This hypothetical transaction is represented in the following diagram. The chronological steps
in the transaction are indicated by numbers in parentheses. The defined terms of U.C.C.
Article 4A are used, highlighted, and explained in detail below.
Z' A payments obligation to be discharged bv a funds transfer can arise from virtually any sort of underlying
contractual relationship between the buyer-payor and seller-payee. While the underlying contractual obligation
in this hypothetical involves goods, in reality financial transactions generate the bulk of funds transfers. Most
large-value funds transfer activity is associated with securities and foreign exchange trading. See Raj Bhala, The
Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL 347 (winter 1993-94) and BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN ELEVEN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 21 5 (3rd ed. 1989).
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Each of these parties, and the actions each undertakes, has a specific legal label
in U.C.C. Article 4A. Applying the correct labels is the first step in the process of distilling
Article 4A to its essential ingredients. Each payment instruction is a "payment order" if it
meets the requirements of the definition of that term. This term is critical in defining the
scope of the law.
The automobile manufacturer is the "originator" of the funds transfer, that is,
"the sender of the first payment order in a funds transfer."9' The bank at which the
automobile manufacturer maintains an account and to which the first payment order is
addressed is the "originator's bank."2' The steel company is the "beneficiary" of the
originator's payment order.L' Also, it is the beneficiary of each payment order issued in
the funds transfer chain that implements the originator's order, i.,e the payment order issued
by the originator's bank and the second bank. The "beneficiary" is simply "the person to be
paid by the beneficiary's bank."-'L The bank at which the steel company maintains its
account and to which funds are credited is the "beneficiary's bank.'"1' This term is reserved
for "the bank identified in a payment order in which an account of the beneficiary is to be
credited pursuant to the order or which otherwise is to make payment to the beneficiary if
the order does not provide for payment to an account."33' The second bank is the
"intermediary bank" in that it is "a receiving bank other than the originator's bank or the
beneficiary's bank."'4
8/ U.C.C. Section 4A-104(c).
29 U.C.C. Section 4A-104(d). There is no requirement in this definition, or elsewhere in Article 4A, that the
originator have a pre-existing account relationship with the originator's bank. There is no definition of
"originator's bank" in the Model Law.
101 U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(2).
L U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(3).
2/ U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(3). Here too, there is no requirement of a pre-existing account relationship. There is
no definition of a "beneficiary's bank" in the Model Law.
"2' U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(3).
4' U.C.C. Section 4A-1 04(b). See U.N. Model Law Article 2(g).
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Diagram: Hypothetical example of a funds transfer
(6) Payment order issued by the originator's bank (10) Payment order issued by the intermediary bank
(7) Payment order received by the intermediary bank (11) Payment order received by the beneficiary's bank
(8) Payment order accepted by the intermediary bank (12) Payment order accepted by the beneficary's bank
(9) Settlement between the originator's bank and the (13) Settlement between the intermediary bank and the
intermediary bank benefiaary's bank
Automobile+ |
manufacturer's bank Second Bank Steel company's bankThenoriginatr's bank The intermediary bank The beneficiary's bankThe originator's bank
A receiving bank with A receiving bank with
respect o the originator's respect o the originator's A receiving bank with
payment order and bank's payment order and respect o the payment
a sender with respect o a sender with respect o order issued by
its own crder issued to its own order issued to the intermediary bank.
the intermediary bank. the beneficiary's bank.
$
(2) Payment order issued by (14) Payment. $
the originator to the originator's bank. Credit to the $
(3) Payment order received beneficiary's $
by the originator's bank. account. $
(4) Payment order accepted $
by the originator's bank. $
(5) The originator pays the originator's bank S
for the payment order.
(1) Underlying contract
Automobile manufacturer calling for the beneficiary Steel company
Originator . to deliver steel to the ..... Beneficiary
Also a sender originator in considera-
tion of $100,000.
Adjunct to (12). Obligation of the originator to pay
$100,000 to the benefidary is discharged when the
benefidary's bank accepts the payment order.
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The terms "sender" and "receiving bank" are generic: a sender is "the person
giving the instruction to the receiving bank" and the receiving bank is "the bank to which the
sender's instruction is addressed.''-" The automobile manufacturer (the originator), the bank
of the automobile manufacturer (the originator's bank), and the second bank (the intermediary
bank) are all senders. The originator's bank, intermediary bank, and beneficiary's bank (the
steel company's bank) are receiving banks.
The "funds transfer" is the entire "series of transactions, beginning with the
originator's payment order, made for the purpose of making payment to the beneficiary of the
order."-L' It includes the payment orders issued by the originator's bank and the
intermediary bank, because these are "intended to carry out the originator's payment
order."'2` The funds transfer "is completed by acceptance by the beneficiary's bank of a
payment order for the benefit of the beneficiary of the originator's payment order.' -'
The sale of steel by the steel company to the automobile manufacturer is the
underlying contract between the beneficiary and originator of the funds transfer. Under the
terms of the contract, the originator has a $100,000 payment obligation, and the originator
begins the funds transfer for the purpose of discharging this obligation.L9'
The concept of discharge is tricky in two senses. First, its legal importance is
not always clearly understood. The crucial point is that until the funds transfer is completed,
which occurs when the beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order for the beneficiary, the
originator is legally liable on this obligation - it is not discharged.2W' The originator's
obligation to pay the beneficiary based on the contract for steel is not discharged until the
beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order for the benefit of the beneficiary. Thereafter, the
originator cannot be sued by the beneficiary for breach of contract on the grounds of non-
payment.
Second, seemingly synonymous uses of the terms "payment obligation" (or
"payment"), "settlement obligation" (or "settlement") and "discharge" sometimes generate
confusion. In the funds transfer context, the underlying payment obligation refers to the
'5' U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(4)-(5). See U.N. Model Law Article 2(f) (defining "receiving bank").
'6' U.C.C. Section 4A-104(a).
7/ Id.
8 Id.
'91 U.C.C. Section 4A-406(b). See U.N. Model Law, Article 19, footnote.
20/ U.C.C. Sections 4A-1 04(a) and 4A-406(a)-(b).
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obligation of the originator to pay the beneficiary. This obligation arises from the underlying
contractual obligation between those two parties. When the obligation is satisfied, it is said
to be legally discharged. Each sender whose payment order is accepted by a receiving bank
has a payment obligation to that bank, namely, to pay for the accepted order. The terms
"settlement" and "settlement obligation" refer to an interbank payment obligation that arises
from the acceptance of a payment order. That is, they refer to the payment obligation as
between a sending and receiving bank. However, these interpretations are based more on
customary and trade usage than specific sections of U.C.C. Article 4A.21w
Each receiving bank has a decision to make when it receives a payment order:
should it accept or reiect the order? The receiving bank is not obligated to accept an
order.22' A receiving bank may reject an order because the sender does not have sufficient
funds in its account to pay for the order. Or, a receiving bank may reject a payment
instruction because it states conditions with which the bank is unwilling or unable to comply.
A receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank (ie, the originator's bank and
intermediary bank) accepts a payment order by executing the order.23' "Execution" of a
payment order means that the bank "issues a payment order intended to carry out the
payment order received by the bank."L' Thus, the originator's bank accepts the payment
order of the originator by issuing an order that conforms with the instructions set forth in the
order of the originator. Similarly, the intermediary bank accepts the payment order of the
originator's bank by issuing a conforming order designed to implement the originator's bank's
order.
A beneficiary's bank, however, does not accept a payment order by
execution.- Rather, the beneficiary's bank, if it accepts the order, is required to pay the
21/ ERNEST T. PATRIKIS, THOMAS C. BAXTER, JR., AND RAJ BHALA, WIRE TRANSFERS 72-3 (1993).
22/ U.C.C. Section 4A-209 and official comment 3. See U.N. Model Law, Articles 7(2), 8(2), 9 and 10(1). The
receiving bank is free to enter into an account agreement with its sender-customer specifying that the bank will
accept all payment orders issued by that customer. In this instance, the bank cannot reject the order. In
addition, a receiving bank is unable to reject a payment order transmitted through Fedwire. This is because one
of the ways in which a receiving bank accepts a payment order is obtaining payment from its sender. U.C.C.
Section 4A-209(b)(2). With a funds transfer through Fedwire, the payment order and payment (i.e., the
instruction and value) move simultaneously from sender to originator. ERNEST . PATRIKtS, THOMAS C. BAXTER,
AND RAI BHALA, WIRE TRANSFERS 174 (1993).
22i/ U.C.C. Section 4A-209(a).
241 U.C.C. Section 4A-301 (a). See U.N. Model Law Article 2(1).
25/ U.C.C. Section 4A-301(a). The U.N. Model Law does not clarify this point.
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beneficiary the amount of the order.!' Typically, it does so by crediting the account of the
beneficiary maintained at the beneficiary's bank.
A receiving bank's decision to accept or reject a payment order is partly a
credit judgment: if the order is accepted, then the sender must pay for the order (, the
originator must pay $100,000 to the originator's bank if the bank accepts the originator's
order, the originator's bank must pay $100,000 to the intermediary bank if the intermediary
bank accepts the originator's bank's order, and so forth.)27' The credit issue arises where
a sender does not currently have funds in its account with the receiving bank sufficient to pay
for the payment order. The receiving bank may, in its discretion, grant the sender an
overdraft. But, any receiving bank, including a central bank, may charge interest to the
sender for the amount and duration of the overdraft.2-'
If the bank entitled to payment is a receiving bank other than the beneficiary's
bank (i.e, the originator's bank or an intermediary bank), then the obligation to pay arises
upon acceptance but does not mature until the execution date. That is, payment is not due
until the day on which it is proper for the receiving bank to execute the order?-9' Generally,
the execution date is the day the order is received.3L1 This is referred to as "same-day
execution," which means that the receiving bank executes the order on the day it is received
261 U.C.C. Section 4A-404(a). While this duty is plainly sensible, the liability for failing to perform it is unique in
the statute. Failure to pay the beneficiary the amount of an accepted order is the only instance where the statute
expressly provides for consequential damages, though the bank has a defense that it had a "reasonable doubt"
as to the entitlement of the beneficiary to payment. With respect to other duties imposed on receiving banks,
liability for consequential damages is precluded unless such banks expressly agree to assume this liability in
writing with their sender-customers. See U.C.C. Section 4A-305. The liability rules of U.C.C. Article 4A are not
treated in this chapter. However, they are relevant not only for those involved in the development of funds
transfer law in other countries but also for those giving or seeking practical legal advice. See Note, Cancellation
of Wire Transfers Under Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code: Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. Revisited, 70 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 739 (1992); Ernest T. Patrikis, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., and Raj
Bhala, Article 4A: The New Law of Funds Transfers and the Role of Counsel, 23 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
LAW JOURNAL 219 (1991); and Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. and Raj Bhala, Proper and Improper Execution of Payment
Orders, 45 BUSINESS LAWYER 1447 (1990).
27/ U.C.C. Section 4A-402(b)-(c). See U.N. Model Law Article 5(6).
28/ With respect to a Federal Reserve Bank, see, e.g., "Modification of the Payments System Risk Reduction Program;
Daylight Overdraft Pricing," 57 Federal Register 47084 (Oct. 14, 1992) and "Modification of the Payments
System Risk Reduction Program; Measurement of Daylight Overdrafts," 57 Federal Register 47093 (Oct. 14,
1992).
29/ U.C.C. Section 4A-301 (b). Receiving banks are free to establish cut-off times for the receipt of payment orders.
See U.C.C. Section 4A-106 and U.N. Model Law Article 2(k). Note that the Model Law defines "execution
period" in lieu of the concepts of "execution date" and "payment date."
30/ Id. See U.N. Model Law Article 11(1).
- 12 -
from the sender. On or before that day, the sender must pay for the order.!" Payment by
a sender to a receiving bank for a payment order issued by the former and accepted by the
latter may be made by a number of means. These include receipt of final settlement on the
bcoks of a central bank or through a funds transfer system (which may involve bilateral or
multilateral netting), a credit to an account of the receiving bank with the sender, or a debit
to an account of the sender with the receiving bank.32'
If the bank entitled to payment is the beneficiary's bank, then again the
obligation to pay arises upon acceptance by that bank. Here, however, the sender (in the
hypothetical, the intermediary bank) need not pay the beneficiary's bank until the payment
date. That is the date on which the amount of the payment order accepted by the
beneficiary's bank is payable to the beneficiary.33' Typically, it is the date of receipt."'
The beneficiary's bank can pay the beneficiary by crediting its account.!- The beneficiary
is paid as a matter of law when it "is notified of the right to withdraw the credit" or funds "are
otherwise made available to the beneficiary," or the bank lawfully applies the credit to a debt
of the beneficiary."-6/
The above discussion has not expressly highlighted the role of a central bank
in a funds transfer. The conventional but incomplete view is that a central bank is the
intermediary bank. To be sure, a central bank often is the intermediary between two
commercial banks (the originator's and beneficiary's bank), the upstream originator, and the
downstream beneficiary. However, a central bank can play any role in a funds transfer:
originator, originator's bank, intermediary bank, beneficiary's bank, or beneficiary. Thus, the
critical point is that a central bank can be a sender or receiving bank at any point in a funds
transfer chain.
Insertion of the central bank at any point in the funds transfer would not alter
the case study as a legal matter unless funds transfer rules set forth in U.C.C. Article 4A (or
311 In the hypothetical transaction, assume that the originator issues its payment order on day 1 and the originator's
bank receives it on that day. Assuming that the originator does not specifically instruct the originator's bank to
execute on a future day, the bank will execute it on day 1. The execution is, therefore, on the same day as the
day of receipt (day 1), and payment from the originator to the originator's bank is due on or before that day.
32/ U.C.C. Section 4A-403(a).
33/ U.C.C. Section 4A-401.
34/ Id.
L" U.C.C. Section 4A-405(a).
36 Id.
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the U.N. Model Law) are modified by the rules of the central bank.37' However, there is
an important practical difference. A central bank cannot go bankrupt, thus there is no credit
risk associated with sending a payment order to, or receiving a payment order from, a central
bank. If the funds transfer is not completed, then the reason for the non-completion will lie
with a party other than the central bank.
37/ An example of such rules would be Regulation J of the Board of Govemors of the Federal Reserve System. As
indicated below, however, Regulation Jelects Article 4A as the governing law and the deviations from the statute
are, on balance, minimal.
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IV. DISCUSSION OF THE FIVE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
Scope rule
What is the scope of application of the law? How does a party seeking to send
funds electronically know whether the transmission is a funds transfer governed by applicable
funds transfer law? Who is included and who is excluded? Appropriate answers to these
questions foster certainty and efficiency, in part by reducing the likelihood of litigation about
the coverage of the law and thus reducing potential legal costs.
These questions are answered in U.C.C. Article 4A by referring to the definition
of "payment order." If an instruction is not a "payment order'" then Article 4A is not
applicable. The term "payment order" means:
an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted orally,
electronically, or in writing, to pay, or to cause another bank to pay, a
fixed or determinable amount of money to a beneficiary, if:
(i) the instruction does not state a condition to payment to the beneficiary
other than time of payment,
(ii) the receiving bank is to be reimbursed by debiting an account of, or
otherwise receiving payment from, the sender, and
(iii) the instruction is transmitted by the sender directly to the receiving bank or to
an agent, funds-transfer system, or communication for transmittal to the
receiving bank.0'
There are five salient features of this definition. First, the instruction must be
issued to a "bank." While any person can be a "sender," only a "bank" can be a "receiving
bank."39 A "bank" is "a person engaged in the business of banking and includes a savings
bank, savings and loan association, credit union, and trust company.'"' This definition is
LI' U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(1) (emphasis supplied). See U.N. Model Law Article 2(b).
39/ U.C.C. Section 4A-1 03(a)(4)-(5). "Person" is used throughout he definition sections of U.C.C. Article 4A but not
defined therein. Therefore, the U.C.C. Article 1 definition would apply. U.C.C. Section 1-1 05(d). Under Article
1, a "'person' includes an individual or an organization." U.C.C. Section 1-201(30).
40/ U.C.C. Section 4A-105(a)(2).
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flexible, applying to a variety of financial institutions that offer account services - regular
commercial banks and certain other types of financial institutions that take deposits and make
loans. Thus, the scope of application is potentially wide.
Second, the amount of the instruction must be "fixed or determinable." In
most cases, the application of this requirement is straightforward. In the hypothetical, the
$100,000 amount is "fixed."
Third, the definition of "payment order" requires that the instruction contain
no condition other than time of payment.L" If the automobile manufacturer's instruction
to its bank said "pay $100,000 on day 10 if you receive delivery of shipping documents
pertaining to the purchased steel," then the requirement would not be satisfied. Only the
statement regarding day 10 is permissible; the statement regarding presentation of documents
to the bank is a condition other than time of payment. If both statements are included in the
instruction, then it is not a "payment order" and U.C.C. Article 4A is inapplicable.
The fourth requirement concerns payment for the payment instruction. A
receiving bank that receives a payment instruction from its sender must be reimbursed by
debiting an account of, or otherwise receiving payment from, the sender.A2' This means that
credit transfers are included, but all electronic funds transfers that are debit transfers are
excluded.4' In the hypothetical, if the originator's bank is reimbursed for the automobile
company's payment order by debiting an account of the company, then this requirement is
met.
The way in which this result is obtained raises the important distinction
between a credit and debit transfer. "In a credit transfer the instruction to pay is given by the
person making payment. In a debit transfer the instruction to pay is given by the person
receiving payment."4-` The classic example of a debit transfer involves a check or other
negotiable instrument.45' In a check transaction, a debtor (the drawer of the check) gives
authority to the creditor (the payee of the check) to draw on the debtor's account which is
4" U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(1)(i).
42/ U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(1)(ii).
43 U.C.C. Section 4A-1 03(a)(1 )(ii) official comment 4.
44/ Id. See also U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note, p. 1 1.
45/ Negotiable instruments are governed by U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4. U.C.C. Sections 3-102 and 4-102.
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maintained at the payor bank (also called the drawee).AL' The authority is given by drawing
the check and transferring the check to the payee. In turn, the payee issues the instruction
to pay to the payor bank when it deposits the check.4" That is, the payee (not the drawer)
issues the instruction by depositing the check in the depositary bank (at which the payee
maintains an account), and the check is presented to the payor bank through the check
collection process."' Assuming the payor bank honors the check, it is reimbursed by the
debtor, not the person giving the instruction (the payee).49' "Article 4A is limited to
transactions in which the account to be debited by the receiving bank is that of the person
in whose name the instruction is given.''"S In sum, in a funds transfer the payor (originator)
issues the instruction (payment order) to the paying bank (originator's bank) and reimburses
that bank. In a check transaction the payee issues the instruction (the check) and the paying
bank (payor bank) is reimbursed by the drawer of the check.
Finally, to qualify as a payment order, an instruction must be transmitted
directly by the sender to the receiving bank (or its agent, funds transfer system, or
communication system for subsequent transmission to the receiving bank).-` In the
hypothetical, each instruction is directly transmitted from sender to receiving bank. This
requirement serves to exclude from U.C.C. Article 4A payments made by means of a check
or credit card, for example.'
Assume that the parties know that U.C.C. Article 4A applies to their transfer.
Does it apply to the entire transfer, from the originator to the beneficiary? This is the issue
of "end-to-end" coverage. Generally speaking, U.C.C. Article 4A is intended to apply end-to-
end.S-3 The rules of a funds transfer system like Fedwire - namely, Regulation J of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System - ensure such coverage. For example, if
the funds transfer is through Fedwire, then whether remote parties (i.e., those that are not in
46/ U.C.C. Sections 3-102(l)(d) (the "drawer" is a secondary party on the check, whereas the payor bank becomes
primarily liable upon accepting the check); 3-302 ("payee" may be a holder in due course), and 4-105(b)
(definition of "payor bank").
471 U.C.C. Section 3-102(1)(a) (definition of "issue").
481 U.C.C. Section 4-105(a) (definition of "depositary bank").
49/ U.C.C. Section 4A-104 official comment 4.
Lo/ U.C.C. Section 4A-104 official comment 4.
5"1 U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(1)(iii).
52/ U.C.C. Section 4A-103(a)(1) official comment 5.
53/ U.C.C. Prefatory Note, iii and Section 4A-507(c).
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privity with a Federal Reserve Bank) are bound by Regulation J depends on whether they had
prior notice that (1) Fedwire might be used and (2) the applicable law governing Fedwire is
Regulation J.5-4 Privity means that the parties send payment orders directly to or receive
orders directly from a Reserve Bank.2' These requirements presumably avoid the
unwarranted extension of Regulation J or the extraterritorial application thereof in
inappropriate situations.161 Regulation J, however, essentially states that U.C.C. Article 4A
is the law governing Fedwire.2' Similarly, the rules of the CHIPS system make clear that
Article 4A governs that system.5&'
Trigger event
At what point are the rights and obligations of a party to a funds transfer
triggered? In other words, when does the party gain certain legal entitlements, and when is
it legally "on the hook" to perform certain duties? Appropriate answers to these questions
can promote certainty. The answers also can ensure that funds transfers are conducted
efficiently, specifically, in a high speed manner.
The answers are provided in U.C.C. Article 4A by the concept of acceptance.
"Rights and obligations underArticle 4A arise as the result of 'acceptance' of a payment order
by the bank to which the order is addressed."5' Only when a receiving bank accepts a
payment order issued by its sender are the rights and obligations of the receiving bank and
sender triggered.
As the hypothetical suggests, acceptance is divided according to the class of
receiving bank. A receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank, in the example, the
originator's bank and the intermediary bank (the automobile manufacturer's bank and the
second bank, respectively), can accept a payment order only by executing the order.
"Execution" means the issuance of a payment order that conforms with the terms of the order
541 12 C.F.R. Section 210.25(b)(2)(v) (1992).
55 12 C.F.R. Section 210.25(b)(2)(ii)-(iii) (1992).
56/ See 12 C.F.R. subpt. B, app. A comment (a) to Section 210.25 (1992).
5"7 See ERNEST . PATRIKIS, THOMAS C. BAXTER, JR., AND RAJ BHALA, WIRE TRANSFERS 140 (1993).
58/ See id. at 191.
59' U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note p. iv (emphasis supplied). See also Section 4A-209 (regarding acceptance of
a payment order) and official comment 1 thereto ("[a]cceptance of the payment order imposes an obligation on
the receiving bank to the sender if the receiving bank is not the beneficiary's bank, or to the beneficiary if the
receiving bank is the beneficiary's bank."). See U.N. Model Law Article 5(6).
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received from the sender..§'
In contrast, a beneficiary's bank is responsible for crediting the account of the
b-neficiary (or otherwise lawfully applying funds received on behalf of the beneficiary).
There are essentially three acts that constitute "acceptance" by a beneficiary's bank: (1)
payment by the beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary; (2) notification from the beneficiary's
bank to the beneficiary that a payment order has been received; or (3) receipt of payment by
the beneficiary's bank from the sender that issued the payment order to the beneficiary's
bank.L" Acceptance occurs at the earliest of these times. The first two acts involve the
"downstream" relationship between the beneficiary's bank and its customer, the
beneficiary.62' The third act involves the "upstream" relationship between the beneficiary's
bank and its sender.03'
What rights and obligations are triggered upon acceptance of a payment order?
Again, there is bifurcation. The basic duty of a sender whose payment order is accepted by
a receiving bank is to pay the receiving bank for the order. Conversely, the basic right of the
receiving bank is to be paid for the accepted order. While this right-duty set is triggered
upon acceptance, it does not mature until the execution date.64' In addition, the sender has
a right to have its payment order, upon acceptance, executed at the right time, in the right
amount, and to the right place.L' This is a trinity of rights which, from the receiving bank's
perspective, constitute a trinity of duties.
60/ U.C.C. Sections 4A-209(a) and 4A-301(a).
6U U.C.C. Section 4A-209(b). This list is incomplete because there is a fourth manner of acceptance. A
beneficiary's bank can do nothing with the payment order received and wait until the opening of the next funds-
transfer business day. In other words, the beneficiary's bank can defer acceptance ovemight (and, therefore,
defer payment to the beneficiary). The incentive to do this is to "buy time" to see whether the sender will pay
for the order. (Delaying acceptance is not possible if the beneficiary's bank has been paid by its sender, because
that payment is by definition a form of acceptance.) U.C.C. Section 4A-209(b)(3) and official comment 5. See
also Section 4A-405 official comment 2. Of course, this method of acceptance is unavailable if the funds transfer
is through a system like Fedwire, because the payment order and payment are received simultaneously.
62/ Payment by a beneficiary's bank to a beneficiary is govemed by U.C.C. Section 4A-405, which is discussed
below in the context of the receiver finality rule.
63/ Payment by a sender to a receiving bank is covered in U.C.C. Section 4A-403.
64/ U.C.C. Section 4A402(c). Note that if the receiving bank is the beneficiary's bank, then the obligation of the
sender to pay matures on the payment date, which is the date the order is payable by the beneficiary's bank to
the beneficiary. Thus, the beneficiary's bank is afforded the legal protection of being entitled to payment from
its sender no later than the time it must pay its customer, i.e., it need not have paid out before receiving inter-
bank settlement. U.C.C. Section 4A-402(b).
65/ U.C.C. Section 4A-302(a).
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The right-duty set pertaining to the beneficiary's bank and the beneficiary is
straightforward. Upon acceptance of a payment order, the beneficiary's bank has an
obligation to pay the order, and the beneficiary has a right to be paid.A' These mature on
the payment date, which typically is the day the order is received by the beneficiary's
bankY`
Receiver finality
When does a beneficiary know that it has received "good funds"? If the steel
company receives a $100,000 credit to its account, is the credit provisional (revocable), on
the one hand, or final on the other hand? If the credit is revocable, then the steel company
cannot irrevocably commit the $100,000 to other uses ( paying its bills, paying dividends,
investing in new projects, and the like). This is because the steel company's bank (the
beneficiary's bank) might demand that the $100,000 be returned if the bank does not finally
receive payment from the intermediary bank. An answer to this dilemma is crucial if a funds
transfer is to be a certain, efficient (especially high speed), and fair mode of payment.
Once a beneficiary's bank has paid the beneficiary, it has thereby satisfied the
obligation to pay the beneficiary that arises from its acceptance of a payment order on behalf
of the beneficiary. The payment is final.2' The payment for the funds transfer cannot be
recovered by the beneficiary's bank. This is the receiver finality rule. Even the beneficiary's
right to withdraw a credit (je, even if the beneficiary's account has been credited but the
beneficiary has not withdrawn the credit) cannot be revoked.
The receiver finality rule is subject to one important exception.92' Consider
a major settlement failure ih a funds-transfer system that nets payment obligations on a
multilateral (or net-net) basis and has a loss-sharing arrangement among participants in the
system to handle a settlement failure by one or more participants.7' If a beneficiary's bank
accepts a payment order but the multilateral netting system fails to complete settlement in
spite of the operation of the loss-sharing scheme, then the acceptance is nullified and the
66/ U.C.C. Section 4A-404(a).
67/ U.C.C. Section 4A401.
68/ U.C.C. Section 4A-405(c). The U.N. Model Law does not contain a receiver finality rule because it does not
purport to govern the relationship between the beneficiary's bank and the beneficiary. That relationship is
governed by local law.
69/ An additional exception, not treated here, pertains to funds transfers involving automated clearing houses. See
U.C.C. Section 4A405(d).
70/ U.C.C. Section 4A-405(e). The classic example of such a system is CHIPS.
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beneficiary's bank can recover funds from the beneficiary.7" In this unwind scenario, the
funds transfer is not completed, the originator is not discharged on its underlying obligation
to the beneficiary, and each sender is excused from its obligation to pay for its payment
order. This exception to the receiver finality rule supports the development of loss-sharing
agreements and other methods to achieve finality on privately operated funds transfer systems
that rely on netting. The unwind exception is a "last resort escape" from potentially
expensive settlement guarantees that remaining (and presumably solvent) participants in the
funds transfer system might be unable to meet. Only by accounting for the potential trade-off
between settlement guarantees and finality can the law promote netting systems designed to
offer their users finality on a routine basis.
Because of this exception to the receiver finality rule, some observers (e.g.,
officials at the Bundesbank and Bank for International Settlements) contend that a real-time,
gross-settlement (RTGS) funds transfer system is preferable to a netting system. In a RTGS
system, there is no worrisome overhang of a possible settlement unwind, yet this possibility
plagues a multilateral netting system. Of course, netting serves the purpose of lowering
systemic risk by reducing the number and volume of funds transfers. Ultimately, the choice
between the systems may depend on country, market, and technological conditions.
The receiver finality rule is constrained when the beneficiary's bank (having
accepted a payment order) has a "reasonable doubt concerning the right of the beneficiary
to payment."!j' But, the beneficiary's bank risks incurring liability for consequential
damages as a result of its nonpayment if the beneficiary demands payment, the bank has
notice of "particular circumstances that will give rise to consequential damages as a result of
nonpayment," and it is shown that the bank lacked reasonable doubt.'3' This is the only
instance in U.C.C. Article 4A where consequential damages are a remedy provided by the
statute, absent a written agreement between parties that calls for consequential damages.74'
Interloper fraud rule
Modern day electronic pirates abound. A fraudsperson (also called an
interloper) claiming to be an official of the automobile manufacturer could send a payment
711 Id.
72/ U.C.C. Section 4A404(a).
73/ Id.
74 U.C.C. Section 4A-305(c)-(d) (consequential damages for late or improper execution of a payment order, or
failure to execute a payment order, are not recoverable unless agreed to expressly in writing by the receiving
bank).
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order to the automobile manufacturer's bank instructing that $100,000 be paid to an account
#10017 at the BCCI in the Grand Cayman Islands. How is the automobile manufacturer's
bank to determine whether the payment order is really that of its customer, the automobile
manufacturer? If the bank executes the order and debits the automobile manufacturer's
account for $100,000, is the bank obliged to re-credit the account when it is discovered that
the payment order was not authentic? What if the payment order is issued by an employee
or agent of the automobile manufacturer that has access to its bank account information?
Appropriate answers to these questions promote certainty, efficiency in the sense of high
security, and fairness.
U.C.C. Article 4A addresses the interloper fraud problem through the concept
of a "security procedure" and rules based on the existence or non-existence of such a security
procedure.
A security procedure is the generic term for a device or method (whether an
electronic message authentication or other computer algorithm, code words, telephone call-
back, or the like) for "verifying that a payment order is that of the customer..... 7 The
U.C.C. Article 4A rules are summarized as follows:
In a large percentage of cases, the payment order of the originator of the
funds transfer is transmitted electronically to the originator's bank. In these
cases it may not be possible for the bank to know whether the electronic
message has been authorized by its customer. To ensure that no
unauthorized person is transmitting messages to the bank, the normal
practice is to establish security procedures that usually involve the use of
codes or identifying words. If the bank accepts a payment order that
purports to be that of its customer after verifying its authenticity by
complying with a security procedure agreed to by the customer and the
bank, the customer is bound to pay the order even if it was not authorized.
But there is an important limitation on this rule. The bank is entitled to
payment in the case of an unauthorized order only if the court finds that the
security procedure was a commercially reasonable method of providing
security against unauthorized payment orders. The customer can also avoid
liability if it can prove that the unauthorized order was not initiated by an
employee or other agent of the customer having access to confidential
security information or by a person who obtained that information from a
source controlled by the customer....If the bank accepts an unauthorized
payment order without verifying it in compliance with a security procedure,
75 U.C.C. Section 4A-201. See U.N. Model Law Article 5(1).
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the loss falls on the bank.7'
Three analytical steps are apparent from the summary: the agreement; commercial
reasonability; and the "not an insider" defense.
First, has a security procedure been established pursuant to an agreement
between the sender and receiving bank? If no procedure exists, then interloper fraud issues
are resolved under non-U.C.C. Article 4A principles, specifically, the law of agency, that is,
the law that establishes when one person is considered to be acting on behalf of another.77'
The resolution that might be achieved under this law will turn on whether the fraudsperson
sent the payment order with the authority (whether actual or apparent) of the purported
sender. Thus, if no security procedure exists between the automobile manufacturer and its
bank, then whether the payment order issued by the fraudsperson was authorized by the
automobile manufacturer will be determined under applicable agency law principles.
A security procedure, in theory, is not unilaterally imposed by one party or the
other, but rather results from negotiations culminating in a written account agreement. To
be sure, many customers are likely to have a standard-form contract specifying a particular
procedure presented to them by their banks. Assuming that a security procedure has been
agreed to between the bank and its customer, the next step is to consider whether that
procedure is "commercially reasonable."
"Commercial reasonability" is a question of law, not fact. The judge's
discretion is limited by U.C.C. Article 4A, which sets out criteria for evaluating whether a
security procedure is commercially reasonable in a case at bar: "the wishes of the customer
expressed to the bank, the circumstances of the customer known to the bank, including the
size, type and frequency of payment orders normally issued by the customer to the bank,
alternative security procedures offered to the customer, and security procedures in general
use by customers and receiving banks similarly situated."`2'
To avoid liability, the originator's bank in the hypothetical must prove that the
security procedure it agreed to with its customer is commercially reasonable. In addition, the
761 U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note p. vii (emphasis supplied). The rules are set forth at Sections 4A-201
through 4A-204.
77/ U.C.C. Section 4A-202(a).
78/ U.C.C. Section 4A-202(c). Note that a security procedure can be deemed commercially reasonable, and this
presents bank counsel with a useful negotiating tactic. See Emest T. Patrikis, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., and Raj
Bhala, Article 4A: The New Law of Funds Transfers and the Role of Counsel, 23 UNIFORM CqMMERCIAL CODE
LAW JOURNAL 219, 235-236 (1991).
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bank must show that it accepted the payment order in "good faith" and in compliance with
the procedure.7' Acting in good faith and following the security procedure are issues of
fact and, therefore, matters for a trier of fact such as a jury.
In the hypothetical funds transfer, suppose the originator argues that the
$100,000 issued in its name and accepted by the originator's bank was unauthorized, and
the ensuing $100,000 debit to its account should be reversed. Suppose also that the
automobile manufacturer's bank proves to a judge that the security procedure in operation
between it and the automobile manufacturer by which the payment order was verified was
commercially reasonable. Suppose further that the bank also proves to the trier of fact that
it acted in good faith in accepting the order and in compliance with the procedure. Has the
purported originator, the innocent customer of the bank, lost the case?
Not necessarily, because of the "not an insider" defense. The suspect payment
order may have been issued by a person who was not an employee or agent of the
automobile manufacturer, and who did not gain access to the manufacturer's bank account
information through someone controlled by the manufacturer. In other words, the
fraudsperson may not have been an "insider" of the automobile manufacturer or someone
close to an insider. If the "innocent" automobile manufacturer proves these facts, then the
automobile manufacturer's bank cannot retain payment for the payment order. Note that the
burden of proof has shifted: the automobile manufacturer's bank has the burden on the
matters of a security procedure agreement, commercial reasonability, and good faith and
compliance; but the customer purporting to be a victim of fraud has the burden of the "not
an insider" defense. U' Note also that the "not an insider" defense is difficult to maintain
successfully. A large number of fraud, and even attempted fraud, cases appear to involve
insiders.
There is no comparative negligence analysis or sharing of liability in this legal
scheme. The purported sender/innocent customer (the automobile manufacturer) bears the
full $100,000 loss (in that its account is not re-credited) if (1) the bank proves that it acted in
good faith and complied with a commercially reasonable security procedure and (2) the
customer cannot meet the innocent customer defense requirements.A"
'9 U.C.C. Section 4A-202(b). "Good faith" is defined in Section 4A-1 05(a)(6) as "honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."
LO/ U.C.C. Sections 4A-202 and 4A-203.
Hl The concept of an "electronic signature" is a potential security procedure. However, the precise meaning of this
concept is unclear. On the one hand, it could involve a means to identify the originator of a funds transfer -
in effect, a personal identification code. On the other hand, it could mean not only such a code, but also a
method of telling where the originator is located, the computer she used to send a payment order, etc. - in
effect, a tracing device. Whatever the meaning, the critical legal issue is commercial reasonability.
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Money-back guarantee and discharge
In the hypothetical funds transfer, what rights does each sender (the originator,
originator's bank, and intermediary bank) have if the funds transfer is not completed? (A
funds transfer is complete when the beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order for the
benefit of the beneficiary of the originator's order.Y' For example, is the automobile
manufacturer entitled to a refund of $100,000, or must it commence litigation against some
downstream party to recover the funds? What rights do the automobile manufacturer's bank
and the second bank have in the event of non-completion? Does completion have an effect
on the underlying contractual obligation of the automobile manufacturer to pay $100,000 to
the steel company? Appropriate answers to these questions promote certainty, efficiency in
the form of low litigation costs, and fairness.
A money-back guarantee rule ensures that the originator of a funds transfer, and
each subsequent sender of a payment order in the funds transfer chain, obtains its money
back in the event the transfer is not completed. A funds transfer is said to be completed
when the beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order on behalf of the beneficiaryPY If the
transfer is not completed, then each sender of a payment order in the funds transfer chain is
entitled to a refund of the principal amount of the payment order, plus any accrued
interest.-4 If the transfer is completed, then the originator's underlying contractual
obligation to the beneficiary is discharged.-'
In the hypothetical funds transfer, as soon as the steel company's bank accepts
the payment order issued by the second bank, the funds transfer is complete and the
automobile manufacturer is discharged on its underlying obligation to pay $100,000 to the
steel company. In the event of non-completion, each sender - the automobile manufacturer,
the automobile manufacturer's bank, and the second bank - is entitled to a refund of any
amount it paid for its payment order, plus interest.86'
The money-back guarantee may not be varied by an agreement between the
82/ U.C.C. Section 4A-104(a). See U.N. Model Law Articles 14(1) and 19(1).
83' U.C.C. Section 4A-104(a).
84/ U.C.C. Section 4A-402(c)-(d).
8' U.C.C. Section 4A-406(b).
86~" The rate of interest is determined in accordance with U.C.C. Section 4A-506. Unless otherwise agreed, it is the
Federal funds rate.
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sender and receiving bank.L" However, the rule is subject to the exception that a sender
that selects a particular intermediary bank through which to route a funds transfer bears the
risk of loss associated with the failure of that bank.k'
Suppose the automobile manufacturer instructed its bank to route the $100,000
transfer through BCCI instead of the second bank, and the automobile manufacturer's bank
complies with this instruction and debits its customer's account. Assume that BCCI is closed
by banking supervisors. The closure occurs after BCCI accepts the payment order issued by
the automobile manufacturer's bank and is paid for the order by that bank, but before the
funds transfer is completed (jL, before the steel company's bank accepts BCCI's order). The
effective result of these facts is that the funds are "stuck" at BCCI. Then, the originator is not
entitled to a re-credit of $100,000. The automobile manufacturer's bank can keep the
$100,000, and the automobile manufacturer is subrogated to the right of its bank to claim
against the receiver or trustee of BCCI's assets. (That is, the automobile manufacturer's ability
to retrieve the $100,000 depends on the right of its bank to claim against the receiver.) In
sum, the party (here, the originator) who designates the failed intermediary bank should and
does bear the risk of adverse consequences of that choice.
A note on bank failure
The consequences of bank failure on account holders depend in part on the
time the failure occurs and on which bank in the funds transfer chain fails.
* Failure of an intermediary bank before completion
In the above example, BCCI fails before the funds transfer is complete,
therefore, the risk of loss is assumed by the party that designated the use of the intermediary
bank.
* Failure of an intermediary bank after completion
If BCCI fails after the transfer is complete, then the beneficiary's bank must
have accepted a payment order from BCCI, and the originator must have been discharged,
before the failure. This is because of the definition of "completion" and the discharge
rule.Y' Payment by the beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary is final because of the receiver
87/ U.C.C. Section 4A-402(f).
88/ U.C.C. Section 4A-402(d).
89/ U.C.C. Sections 4A-1 04(a) and 4A-406, respectively.
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finality rule.90J Whether the beneficiary's bank was paid by BCCI for the order it received
and accepted from BCCI before the beneficiary's bank paid the beneficiary depends on the
facts of the case. If the beneficiary's bank accepts BCCI's order by paying the beneficiary
before receiving settlement from BCCI, then the beneficiary's bank assumes the risk of loss
from a BCCI failure.l'
* Failure of the originator's bank before acceptance
The above discussion prompts the question of what happens if BCCI remains
solvent, but the originator's bank or the beneficiary's bank fails. Consider first the case where
the originator's bank fails before accepting the originator's payment order. Plainly, the funds
transfer is not complete and the originator's obligation to pay $100,000 to the beneficiary is
not discharged. Under U.C.C. Article 4A, because the originator's bank failed before
acceptance, the duty of the originator to pay the originator's bank for its order never matured,
hence the originator is not liable for the order it issued.92 It is entitled to a refund of any
money it might have paid to the originator's bank for its payment order.
* Failure of the originator's bank after acceptance
If the originator's bank fails after accepting the order, then the originator is
obligated to pay for its order."' Assuming a same-day execution scenario, the originator's
bank will have accepted the originator's payment order by issuing a conforming order, i.e.,
by executing the originator's order, on the day it received the originator's order.94 Under
U.C.C. Article 4A, if BCCI accepts the order of the originator's bank, then the originator's
bank is liable to pay for its order.95 Whether this liability is affected by applicable Federal
bank regulatory provisions is beyond the scope of this presentation, but the issue raises
90/ U.C.C Section 4A-405(c).
21" Under U.C.C. Section 4A-209(b)(1) (clause (i)), one manner in which the beneficiary's bank can accept a
payment order is by paying the beneficiary in accordance with Section 4A-405(a) or (b). Section 4A405(a)
concerns a credit to the beneficiary's account, and Section 4A-405(b) concerns payment by means other than
a credit as determined by "principles of law that determine when an obligation is satisfied." The point is that
the beneficiary's bank can pay the beneficiary before the bank has received settlement from its sender.
92/ U.C.C. Section 4A402(c).
93/ Id.
24/ U.C.C. Sections 4A-209(a) and 4A-301.
95/ U.C.C. Article 4A-402(b).
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potentially intriguing legal and policy issues.!'
For example, the originator is not discharged until the beneficiary's bank
accepts an order from BCCI, but suppose BCCI is unwilling to accept the order issued by the
originator's bank until the originator's bank provides settlement for its order. In this instance,
BCCI presumably is unwilling to assume the risk that the originator's bank fails after BCCI
accepts the order but before BCCI has been paid for the order. The originator will then bear
that risk, because it may have paid the originator's bank for its payment order but not have
been discharged on its underlying payment obligation to the beneficiary. If the originator's
bank fails before discharge occurs, then the originator is liable to the beneficiary for $100,000
on the underlying contract and must claim against the originator's bank (or its receiver or
liquidator) under the money-back guarantee (or perhaps other applicable law).97 This might
be justified on the ground that the originator is the party that selected the use of the
originator's bank by maintaining an account at, and issuing a payment order to, that bank.
S Failure of the beneficiary's bank
Consider the scenario in which the beneficiary's bank fails. If this occurs after
acceptance, then the originator is discharged on its obligation."' The beneficiary bears the
risk of loss and must make a claim against the failed bank (or its receiver or liquidator).
Again, this might be justifiable because the beneficiary is the party that designated to the
originator in its underlying contract with the originator that payment should be made at the
beneficiary's bank. If failure occurs before acceptance, then the funds transfer is not
complete. The originator (and each subsequent sender) are entitled to the money-back
guarantee.'-' Presumably, the originator will pay the beneficiary through a funds transfer
directed to a different beneficiary's bank (or through an alternative payments mechanism).
961 This scenario is perhaps more likely given the prompt corrective action rules implemented pursuant to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, section 131 (1 991). See
12 C.F.R. Parts 208 and 263 (1993).
27 U.C.C. Section 4A-402(c).
98/ U.C.C. Section 4A-406.
99 U.C.C. Section 4A-402(c).
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V. DRAFTING PRINCIPLES
Interest groups
Law, including payments ystem law, is not handed down from God. Rather,
law results from a long and complicated interaction of interest groups that advance their
economic, political, and social agendas. U.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law are
examples of this interaction. Accordingly, neither Article 4A nor the Model Law appeared
in the law books quickly. The drafters negotiated for years, working and re-working concepts
and specific legal language. It would be foolish to suggest that the work of every drafter
reflected the same or even similar theories as those held by every other drafter. To the
contrary, different drafters had different heories and they negotiated, argued, and ultimately
compromised with one another.
However, it is possible to group the drafters of U.C.C. Article 4A into three
broad interest groups: system users, system providers, and system supervisors. The delegates
to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) that drafted the
U.N. Model Law also tended to reflect these constituencies. The users of large-value credit
transfer systems - typically corporate customers and some (usually smaller) financial
institutions - had consumer interests in mind. Their aim was to ensure that stringent
liabilities were imposed on system providers. Hence, they sought clear rules on misdirected
payment orders, and to hold banks liable for consequential s well as actual damages under
certain circumstances. Often, the arguments of users were cast in terms of fairness.
Conversely, system providers - generally, large banks and owners of particular
systems - sought to minimize their liabilities. They struggled to avoid the imposition of
consequential damages, and ensure that stringent rules governing authenticity and security
procedures were drafted. Typically, their arguments were cast in terms of efficiency and
reliability.
Finally, system supervisors - central banks and finance ministries - sought o
minimize systemic risks. Accordingly, they strongly advocated the receiver finality and
discharge rules. They did not consistently side with users or providers. Indeed, often they
played the role of mediator between users and providers, while at the same time keeping a
watchful eye on their own interests. They would employ the language of fairness, efficiency,
or reliability depending on the needs of the problem at hand.
When drafting a funds transfer law, it may be useful to think in terms of users,
providers, and supervisors as three distinct interest groups whose concerns must be
addressed. However, it is not necessarily desirable to encourage this tripartite division of
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interest groups during the drafting process. The countries of the former Soviet Union, and
the Baltic countries, must draft legal frameworks for large-value funds transfer system in
different environments from the one in which U.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law
were created. Thinking in terms of consumer, bank, and supervisory interests may not
necessarily reflect these different environments.
Instead, it may be particularly fruitful to consider what questions are most
pressing. For example, to what extent is the general commercial law framework well
articulated and well developed? In some instances, the answer is that only a skeletal
framework exists. Are bankruptcy rules in place to handle bank and customer insolvencies?
In some cases, only nascent rules exist, and in other instances no such rules have been
implemented. To what extent is fraud present in commercial transactions? Sadly, in some
cases fraud is relatively commonplace.
The rule of law
The special environment in developingand transition economies - present, for
example, in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and the Baltic countries - suggests five
fundamental drafting principles. First, as a threshold matter the importance of the rule of law
must be established firmly. The payments system law should be manifest at the highest level
of the hierarchy of rules in a particular country. If in a country's legal system a statute has
greater force and effect than a regulation, and in turn a regulation has greater force and effect
than an administrative order, then the law governing funds transfers should take the form of
a statute. This form should afford greater protection against political or bureaucratic meddling
in the payments system. Of course, in certain countries - for instance, Vietnam - passing a
statute is a more cumbersome process than issuing a regulation. Nonetheless, the rule of law
is fundamental to the certain, efficient, and fair operation of a funds transfer system, thus
procedural hurdles in passing laws must be overcome.
Accountability
Second, institutions involved in funds transfers should be held accountable for
their own behavior. Such parties should not expect assistance from the government in the
event of mishaps or financial difficulties. The utmost importance must be accorded rules of
law, not relationships among parties or between a party and the government. In general, a
funds transfer law must be part of a larger legal environment that is founded on individual
financial accountability, not central planning and control. In this regard, the participation of
the central bank in the funds transfer system should not be overemphasized. There is no
necessary reason why it must own and operate a system. Indeed, private party action and
responsibility ought to be encouraged, not only in transition and developing economies, but
also in developed market economies.
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Integration with other bodies of law
Third, funds transfer law cannot develop in a vacuum. This law must be seen
as part of the broad commercial and bankruptcy framework and not developed in a
piecemeal fashion. Accordingly, the rules governing large-value credit transfers must be
consistent with those established for contracts, negotiable instruments, letters of credit,
secured transactions, and insolvencies. Thus, for example, the concepts of "commercial
reasonability" or "good faith" must be used consistently throughout the framework. The
economic incentives created by the different parts of the framework must also be consistent.
Commercial law is a seamless web, and thus there must be a holistic integrity to the law.
Fraud prevention
Fourth, particular emphasis must be given to fraud prevention. Accordingly,
appropriate safeguards must be implemented that create incentives for all parties to a large-
value credit transfer to exercise at least reasonable care. More generally, the legal framework
must be seen as a primary guarantor of the integrity of the payments system. Nothing
undermines that integrity faster than fraud. However, in drafting rules on fraud prevention,
an inevitable tension between security and efficiency must be managed. On the one hand,
requiring receiving banks and their sender customers to exercise great diligence in preventing
fraud raises the level of security. On the other hand, the greater the burden on receiving
banks and senders to act as policemen against fraud, the higher the monetary cost of a funds
transfer, and the longer it may take to process a transfer. There is no simple recipe for
managing this tension; rather, the appropriate solution will depend on the country in
question.
Supporting the financial markets
Fifth, the legal framework for large-value funds transfers should accommodate
the anticipated growth and development of the economy and its constituent sectors. In the
U.S. and other post-industrial societies, the primary motivation for engaging in such transfers
is not to settle payments obligations arising from the sale of goods. In this sense, the case
study discussed above concerning the automobile manufacturer and steel company is
antiquated. In truth, the bulk of credit transfer activity is generated by financial transactions -
- the buying and selling of foreign exchange, short-term money market instruments, and
various types of investment securities. Accordingly, in developing a legal framework for
large-value credit transfers systems, the future needs of the financial community must be
anticipated and addressed.-Lo'
"' See Raj Bhala, The Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL 347 (winter 1993-94).
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VI. SUMMARY
The legal foundations of the large-value credit transfer systems in the United
States, Fedwire and CHIPS, are set forth in U.C.C. Article 4A. The same legal foundations
are found in the U.N. Model Law. Among the many provisions in these legal texts, at least
five are particularly noteworthy: (1) a rule defining the scope of the law; (2) a rule
establishing when the rights and obligations of parties to a funds transfer are triggered; (3) a
receiver finality rule; (4) a rule assigning liability for interloper fraud; and (5) a money-back
guarantee rule, coupled with provisions on discharge. The rules are articulated through
precise terminology identifying each party to a funds transfer and the actions that each party
undertakes.
Must the five rules exist in any funds transfer statute? To what extent can one
generalize from the Article 4A or U.N. Model Law experience? These questions deserve two
levels of analysis. First, comparative legal research on the laws governing large-value credit
transfer systems in other jurisdictions is needed to identify the foundations of those laws. In
other words, those laws need to be distilled. Second, theoretical debate, involving economic
rationales and public policy goals, is required to determine the justifications for alternative
statutory foundations.
While these analyses have yet to be performed, one point of caution is
appropriate: commercial aw, including funds transfer law, is not immutable. It serves
commercial parties and their transactions, but because both of these change over time,
individual needs and systemic oncerns vary as well. Accordingly, the legal foundations of
a regime for large-value credit transfer systems, should be viewed as dynamic, not static.
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